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III. ARGUMENT 
I. ACEY CAN OVERCOME THE JOHNSON-HODGSON 
PROBLEM. 
Mr. Acey's first cause of action is based on the claim that Litton modified 
its at-will relationship with its employees in one important respect in 1995 when it 
adopted a policy of random drug testing and progressive discipline for violators of such 
policy and that Litton breached that modified relationship when it fired Mr. Acey in 
1997 for adulterating his urine sample when he in fact did not do so. 
Litton argues that the disclaimer in its employee handbook issued in 1992 
insulates it completely from liability. Litton argues that Mr. Acey cannot overcome the 
principle of law articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson v. Morton ThiokoL 
Inc.. 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991) and Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah. Inc.. 844 P.2d 331 (Utah 
1992). This principle is that a clear and conspicuous disclaimer makes the rebuttable 
presumption of at-will employment virtually unrebuttable. But the facts are not as 
monolithic as Litton contends and Mr. Acey can overcome this problem. 
Remember that as far as the sequence of the critical documents is 
concerned, Litton first developed its "Personnel Manual." That manual contains the 
complete and official policies and practices of the company. These policies include 
policies on drug testing and discipline of employees. Later, Litton promulgated its 
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Employee Handbook. The Handbook is a summary of the Personnel Manual and the 
policies contained therein. It's not a replacement of such policies but a distillation of 
such policies. The policies themselves control. 
Litton's Personnel Manual does not contain a disclaimer. But the 
Employee Handbook does. The disclaimer in the Employee Handbook does not 
disclaim the policies in the Personnel Manual but the disclaimer does seek to disclaim 
any employment arrangements other than at will. Litton's disclaimer may be 
conspicuous. But whether it's clear is open to debate. Let's look at the actual language 
of the disclaimer. 
The disclaimer does set forth Litton's unilateral desire that its employees 
be considered at-will employees. But it also states that Litton could notify its 
employees otherwise in writing. The disclaimer also states that Litton could modify or 
change this at-will relationship by a specific written agreement between the employee 
and the Division, signed by the Division's President. If effect, the handbook disclaimer 
contains its own disclaimer. 
Then, the disclaimer says something in direct contradiction to these fairly 
clear statements. After the handbook disclaimer says Litton can change the at-will 
relationship in certain circumstances, the disclaimer says no one or nothing can change 
the at-will relationship. A reasonable jury could find this language less than clear. 
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The Receipt for the employee handbook compounds this confusion. The 
Receipt states that nothing in the handbook can form a contract of employment 
(presumably then, not even a contract of at-will employment) but it also states that the 
company can change the policies and practices summarized in the handbook at any time 
(including, presumably, the at-will status of employees) but such changes will be 
effective only if in writing. In other words, the Receipt does not contain the same 
closing-of-the-door language found in the employee handbook (that nothing can change 
the at-will nature of the employment relationship); but, instead, the Receipt states that 
the company can change anything in the handbook as long as it does so in writing. A 
reasonable jury could find these conflicting messages less than clear. 
Litton argues that despite these conflicting messages and the multiple 
statements that Litton could modify the at-will arrangement between itself and those 
employees it hires to do its work, as long as it does so in writing, the disclaimer, 
nevertheless, insulates it from liability for its own actions. Specifically, Litton argues 
that no reasonable jury could find that when Litton (1) promulgated a notice in writing 
implementing random drug testing; (2) agreed in writing to conduct such testing on a 
controlled and carefully monitored basis in accordance with federal law mandating a 
drug free workplace; (3) promulgated a notice in writing implementing progressive 
discipline for violations of such random drug testing policy; and (4) actually followed 
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such a policy of progressive discipline in dealing with its employees, that such didn't 
change or modify the at-will nature of the employment in any respect. But why not? A 
reasonable jury could find that while Litton may have preserved its freedom to fire Mr. 
Acey for any reason or no reason independent of its drug testing program. Litton could 
fire Mr. Acey for violating its drug testing policy only if Mr. Acey did indeed violate 
such policy. 
Litton argues that Mr. Acey bases his argument on the written notice 
implementing random drug testing and progressive discipline for violators that Litton 
posted on its bulletin board in its facility in approximately May 1995. That is true. But 
only partially true. Mr. Acey is not arguing that Litton's posting of a written drug 
testing policy in and of itself totally changed or repudiated the at-will nature of the 
employment. Mr. Acey's argument is that the content of, and implementation thereof, 
the written notice changed the at-will nature of the employment, at least insofar as 
violations of the drug testing policy were concerned. 
In almost all respects, Mr. Acey remained an at-will employee. Litton 
could still fire Mr. Acey for any reason. But if it fired him for violating its drug testing 
policy, it needed to make sure he really did violate the drug testing policy. Why 
shouldn't he base his argument on that "writing"? Litton notified its employees in 
writing that, beginning in July 1995, it would implement a program of random drug 
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testing in compliance with federal law regarding maintaining a drug free workplace. 
The notice explained in writing that Litton would follow a policy of progressive 
discipline with respect to its employees who tested positive for prohibited substances. 
Litton stated in writing that it would not fire employees who tested positive but provide 
them with a second chance. Litton stated in writing that only if such employees failed a 
second drug test would Litton fire them. Litton posted such written notice for all 
employees to see and in a place where Litton expected and desired that it would be 
seen. Litton issued such a written notice under the signature of Mr. Ashcroft, who was 
Litton's Vice President of Operations. A Litton employee could assume that Mr. 
Ashcroft had authority from the Division's President to issue such a written policy. Mr. 
Acey agreed to the policy by remaining employed with Litton and submitting himself to 
testing and discipline. Then, Litton actually practiced a policy of progressive discipline 
with Mr. Acey and others. Under such circumstances, could a Litton employee form a 
belief that while Litton might still be able to fire him for any reason not connected to its 
drug testing program, it could fire him for a reason connected to its drug testing 
program only if such an employee actually violated the drug testing program? 
Certainly. 
In other words, it is possible to harmonize all of the critical documents, 
recognize Litton's obvious unilateral desire to characterize the employment relationship 
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as at will and yet protect Mr. Acey's legitimate expectations that he would be fired for 
violating the drug testing policy only if he violated the drug testing policy. Mr. Acey 
remained an at-will employee for all purposes except one-except as Litton modified 
that policy with respect to its drug testing program. 
Litton argues Mr. Acey cannot overcome the principle articulated in Rio 
Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1980) (that a written contract term 
prevails over an inconsistent implied in fact promise). But he can. Mr. Acey is not 
arguing that Litton's written notice changed all aspects of the at-will relationship set 
forth in the selected sentences of the handbook disclaimer. He is arguing Litton's 
written notice changed the at-will relationship only as to the possibility of being 
terminated for violating the company's drug testing program. 
Mr. Acey is not arguing that Litton gave up all the ramifications of at-will 
employment in 1995. Mr. Acey is not arguing that Litton's adoption of a program of a 
random drug testing and progressive discipline for violators constituted a wholesale 
change or an abandonment of its policy of at-will employment. What constitutes a 
modification Litton's at-will rule is its notice (1) in writing that in adopting a policy of 
random drug testing; it would (2) comply with federal law regarding maintaining a drug 
free workplace; (3) that it would follow a policy of progressive discipline with respect 
to those who violated the policy; and (4) its practice in actually doing so. Litton 
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modified its policy of at-will employment only in one area. Litton probably had to 
follow federal guidelines on maintaining a drug free workplace in order to keep its 
government contracts. Thus, Litton probably had to adopt a program of drug testing. It 
did not have to adopt a policy of progressive discipline as to violators but it did. It did 
not adopt a policy of progressive discipline across the board for all violations of 
workplace rules. Litton adopted a policy of progressive discipline only as to violators 
of the drug policy. It did not have to actually practice progressive discipline as to those 
who violated the drug policy; but it did. 
Isn't this a manifestation of the employer's intent with respect to its drug 
testing program? Isn't this communicated to the employee? Isn't this sufficiently 
definite (in writing no less) to operate as a provision of an employment contract? 
Couldn't an employee believe, quite reasonably, that Litton would terminate an 
employee for violating the drug testing policy only if the employee, in fact, actually 
violated the policy? Wouldn't such an interpretation be consistent with the contract as 
a whole? A reasonable jury could certainly find this to be the case. 
The point in all this exposition is, of course, that Mr. Acey didn't violate 
the drug testing policy in April 1997. Under the summary judgment standard, the trial 
court had to assume that he did not use illicit drugs, that he was not under the influence 
of illicit drugs, and that he did not adulterate his urine sample. Yet Litton fired him for 
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violating its drug policy. Litton's basis for finding that Mr. Acey violated its policy is 
its assumption that because his sample contained nitrites, he must have adulterated his 
sample. In April 1997, the test was a color metric test which showed the presence of 
nitrites-no number as to the level of nitrites was given. The actual level of nitrites was 
not determined until June 28, 1998-fourteen months after Litton fired Mr. Acey. 
Litton does not explain what the cutoff (if any) for nitrites (and suspected 
adulteration) was in April 1997 or even on June 28, 1998. Litton only explains that a 
few months after June 1998, the government set the cutoff level for suspected 
adulteration at 500 mcg/ml. Hence, Litton's argument that its assumption that Mr. 
Acey adulterated his sample was reasonable. But the issue in Mr. Acey's first cause of 
action is not whether Litton's assumption was reasonable, it is whether Litton's 
assumption was correct. The Mandatory Guidelines established one protocol for 
determining whether an employee had adulterated his sample. There may have been 
other ways to make sure that Litton's assumption was correct. Litton just failed to 
follow those Mandatory Guidelines or do anything else to verify its assumption that Mr. 
Acey had violated the drug policy. 
Litton gets to the core of its argument in footnote 6 of its brief. It argues 
that Litton was entitled to terminate Mr. Acey's employment for no reason, or any 
reason, including Litton's belief, mistaken or not, that Mr. Acey's urine sample had 
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been adulterated. But wait a minute. If Litton's handbook and Litton's receipt for its 
handbook say Litton can change the policies or procedures in the handbook as long as 
such changes are in writing and signed by the Division's President (or, arguably, his 
designee) and if Litton promulgates a writing (to which Mr. Acey agrees) which states 
that Litton will provide progressive discipline to those who violate the drug testing 
policy and, if Litton actually does provide progressive discipline to violators, couldn't a 
reasonable jury conclude that Litton could fire Mr. Acey for violating the drug testing 
policy only if he did violate the drug testing policy? And that if it fired somebody for 
violating the drug testing policy who didn't violate it, it might have some liability? 
If the Court believes that Litton's unilateral effort in a disclaimer to 
preserve the at-will status of its employees overrides any and all state and federal 
mandates and guidelines regarding employee drug testing and Litton's own internal 
policies and later promulgated written notices to its employees, then Mr. Acey loses. 
II. LITTON MISCONSTRUES MR. ACEY'S ARGUMENT AS 
TO THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
Mr. Acey's second cause of action is based on the claim that when Litton 
notified its employees in writing that it would implement a policy of random drug 
testing and that it would conduct drug testing on a controlled and carefully monitored 
basis and that it would comply with federal law requiring a drug free workplace and 
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follow a policy of progressive discipline with respect to violators, the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing obligated Litton to make some effort to verify any assumption or 
belief that an employee may have violated the policy by being under the influence of 
illegal substances or by adulterating his sample. 
Litton seems to believe that Mr. Acey is arguing that the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing trumps the at-will rule. That's not Mr. Acey's argument. 
Mr. Acey is not arguing that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
supersedes the at-will rule. As Mr. Acey acknowledged in his opening brief, that 
argument would be dead on arrival. 
Litton also seems to believe that Mr. Acey bases his argument for good 
faith and fair dealing on the premise that the federal drug testing Mandatory Guidelines 
became part of the contract between Litton and Mr. Acey. That is the logical extension 
of Mr. Acey's argument in his first claim for relief. But that is not Mr. Acey's 
argument in his second cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. With respect to the claim for violating the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, Mr. Acey's first premise is that Litton adopted an internal policy in 1990 
(which referred to the federal Drug Free Workplace Act of 1988) which states that 
testing will be accomplished on a controlled and carefully monitored basis. Mr. Acey's 
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second premise is that Litton obligated itself to comply with federal law regarding 
maintaining a drug free workplace. 
Working from those premises, Mr. Acey's argument in his second claim 
is that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing means that if Litton developed a 
suspicion that Mr. Acey was adulterating his sample, it had an obligation to deal with 
Mr. Acey fairly and in good faith-to check out that assumption, to try to make some 
effort to determine if that was the case, to do something to make sure its assumption 
was correct. Litton did not do so. 
As we know, Litton is now arguing (after the fact) that it did do 
something to verify its assumption. What Litton did was retest the very same urine 
sample. Litton doesn't explain the methodology of the retest (it may have been only the 
same dipstick color metric type of test). Well, not surprisingly, such a test found 
nitrites in Mr. Acey's sample. But Litton didn't fire Mr. Acey because he had nitrites 
in his urine. It fired him because it suspected he had artificially put nitrites in his urine. 
What did Litton do to verify adulteration? Nothing. Notably, what Litton did not do 
was follow what the Mandatory Guidelines suggested in cases of suspected 
adulteration. Litton did not test for adulteration or have a medical review officer rule 
out other plausible scenarios (food poisoning, illness, etc.) or have Mr. Acey give 
another sample under controlled conditions. What did Litton do to determine if Mr. 
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Acey had artificially put nitrites in his urine? Nothing. The covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing may not have obligated Litton to follow its own policies or even the 
Mandatory Guidelines, but the covenant obligated Litton to do something to test its 
assumption that Mr. Acey had adulterated his sample. It didn't do anything. That's not 
acting in good faith. That's not dealing fairly. Hence, Mr. Acey's claim for the breach 
of the covenant. 
Litton then tries to argue that its assumption was very reasonable. (That 
even if Litton was wrong, it was a reasonable mistake to make.) It says that later on, it 
concluded that the level of nitrites in Mr. Acey's urine was in an amount substantially 
greater than any amount that would have occurred naturally, without any adulteration. 
Mr. Acey is not saying that Litton's suspicion was not a reasonable suspicion. It was. 
What was not reasonable was its act in terminating a 29-year veteran on the basis of a 
suspected violation of the drug policy without doing anything else to determine if its 
assumption, even its reasonable assumption, was correct. What was not reasonable was 
not doing the type of verification testing the Mandatory Guidelines suggest an employer 
which suspects adulteration to do. 
The only thing that the testing lab determined in April 1997, was that the 
sample was positive for nitrites. That may raise a question of adulteration but not 
proof. Litton made its decision based on assumption. Eighteen months later, the 
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National Laboratory Certification Program promulgated its Program Documents #35 
which, as of September 1998, set the cutoff for concentrating of nitrites for determining 
when a sample is to be deemed adulterated at 500 mcg/ml. What Litton doesn't explain 
is if there was any cutoff in April 1997, when the decision to terminate Mr. Acey was 
made and what the government agency which set the cutoff suggested or mandated to 
confirm suspicions of adulteration. 
If the Court believes that Utah employment law gives Litton the right to 
fire Mr. Acey for violating its drug testing policy even if it is mistaken and wrong and 
does nothing to check its assumption, then Mr. Acey loses. And any employee who is 
subject to drug testing loses. An employer can fire him if he tests positive, or if he tests 
negative, or if his sample is switched or lost, if he artificially put something in his 
sample or put nothing in his sample. It can fire him if he has nitrites in his urine, 
whether those nitrites are there naturally or artificially. It can fire him if he doesn't 
have nitrites in his urine. Maybe Utah employment law, as hostile as some think it is to 
employee's rights, dictates that result. But if the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
in employment relationships means anything, it ought to mean that where an employer 
is invading an employee's privacy (albeit consensually) in furtherance of some national 
good (admirable as it is) and requiring an employee to provide blood or hair or urine to 
determine if that employee is using illegal drugs, such employer had better act not just 
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on the basis of suspicion or assumption-even a reasonable assumption-but it had better 
do the testing in a fair manner and with good faith and with due regard to the possibility 
of error and make sure it's right.1 Mr. Acey is not requiring absolute metaphysical 
certitude but reasonable scientific certainty. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Acey raised genuine issues as to whether Litton's actions in changing 
the employee handbook by written notice and practice modified the at-will nature of 
employment, at least insofar as decisions relating to its drug policy were concerned. 
Mr. Acey also raised genuine issues as to whether the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing required Litton to do something to verify its assumption that Mr. Acey had 
adulterated his sample. 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the trial court and send this case to 
trial. 
]Litton confuses the concepts of liability and damage. In his second cause of action, Mr. Acey 
is alleging Litton breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it failed to verify its 
assumption of adulteration in accordance with its own policies and federal law. The damages flowing 
from such a breach was the termination. But the termination is not a liability question, only one of 
damages. 
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